Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match. NBER Working Paper No. 14864

Autor/inn/en	Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Pathak, Parag A.; Roth, Alvin E.
Institution	National Bureau of Economic Research
Titel	Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match. NBER Working Paper No. 14864
Quelle	(2009) PDF als Volltext Verfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	gedruckt; online; Monographie
Schlagwörter	High Schools; Urban Schools; Efficiency; Student Placement; Admission (School); Public Schools; School Choice; Simulation; New York + Suchen Sie Ihr Suchwort? High school; Oberschule; Urban area; Urban areas; School; Schools; Stadtregion; Stadt; Schule; Effectiveness; Effektivität; Wirkungsgrad; Schülerpraktikum; Public school; Öffentliche Schule; Choice of school; Schulwahl; Simulation program; Simulationsprogramm
Abstract	The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences--ties--in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school--single tie breaking--in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tie breaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions. (As Provided).
Anmerkungen	National Bureau of Economic Research. 1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138-5398. Tel: 617-588-0343; Web site: http://www.nber.org/cgi-bin/get_bars.pl?bar=pub
Erfasst von	ERIC (Education Resources Information Center), Washington, DC
Update	2017/4/10