On the Provision of Unemployment Insurance when Workers are Ex-Ante Heterogeneous.

Autor/inn/en	Setty, Ofer; Yedid-Levi, Yaniv
Titel	On the Provision of Unemployment Insurance when Workers are Ex-Ante Heterogeneous. Gefälligkeitsübersetzung: Über die Ausgestaltung der Arbeitslosenversicherung bei ex-ante heterogenen Arbeitnehmer.
Quelle	In: Journal of the European Economic Association, 19 (2021) 1, S. 664-706 PDF als Volltext Link als defekt meldenVerfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	online; gedruckt; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	1542-4766; 1542-4774
DOI	10.1093/jeea/jvaa015
Schlagwörter	Arbeitslosengeld; Arbeitslosenversicherung; Arbeitsloser; Arbeitsmarktrisiko; Qualifikation; Auswirkung; Heterogenität; Konzeption; Leistungsanspruch; Optimierung; USA
Abstract	"Labor market outcomes demonstrate considerable variation between and within skill groups. We construct a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets and exogenous differences that matches these facts. We study the role of exogenous heterogeneity in choosing the optimal replacement rate and the maximum benefit for an unemployment insurance (UI) system. The optimal average replacement rate is 27%, compared to 0% in a model without exogenous heterogeneity. The relatively generous choice is due to the redistributive role of UI, which is a manifestation of two elements. First, workers who are unemployed more often receive positive net transfers from the UI system because they draw resources more frequently. Second, the existence of a cap on benefits makes UI progressive. Our main result holds in the presence of a generous progressive taxation system." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku, Published by arrangement with John Wiley & Sons).
Erfasst von	Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Nürnberg
Update	2021/3