School Assignment by Match Quality.

Autor/inn/en	Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Dur, Umut Mert; Grigoryan, Aram
Institution	National Bureau of Economic Research
Titel	School Assignment by Match Quality.
Quelle	Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research (2021) PDF als Volltext (1); PDF als Volltext (2) Link als defekt meldenVerfügbarkeit
Reihe	NBER working paper series. w28512
Beigaben	Illustrationen
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	online; Monographie; Graue Literatur
DOI	10.3386/w28512
Schlagwörter	Bildungsertrag; Eltern; Schulwahl; Allgemein bildende Schule; Dienstleistung; Arbeitspapier; Qualität; USA
Abstract	Proponents of school choice argue that it improves educational outcomes by allowing parents to self-select into schools that are most effective for their children. Contrary to these arguments, empirical evidence suggests that parents may not incorporate school effectiveness or match quality when choosing schools. The findings potentially impugn proponents' effectiveness arguments of choice-based assignment. We develop novel solutions that restore effectiveness by maximizing match quality subject to stability constraints. Maximization algorithms are provided for both small and large school districts. Simulations reveal substantial match quality gains from our solutions compared to the celebrated Deferred Acceptance mechanism with a random tie-breaker. Our methodology can be used to optimize for other policy objectives in school choice or other priority-based matching problems.
Erfasst von	ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel
Update	2021/3