Do high-wage jobs attract more applicants? Directed search evidence from the online labor market.

Autor/inn/en	Banfi, Stefano; Villena-Roldán, Benjamín
Titel	Do high-wage jobs attract more applicants? Directed search evidence from the online labor market. Gefälligkeitsübersetzung: Ziehen hohe Löhne mehr Bewerber an? Erkenntnisse über die gezielte Suche auf dem Online-Arbeitsmarkt.
Quelle	In: Journal of labor economics, 37 (2019) 3, S. 715-746 PDF als Volltext Link als defekt meldenVerfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	online; gedruckt; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0734-306X; 1537-5307
DOI	10.1086/702627
Schlagwörter	Einkommenserwartung; Lohnhöhe; Personalbeschaffung; Stellenanzeige; Arbeitsplatzsuchtheorie; Arbeitsuchender; Bewerbungsverhalten; Qualifikationsanforderung; Jobbörse; Informationsangebot; Informationsbeschaffung; Informationsverhalten; Chile
Abstract	"Labor markets become more efficient in theory if job seekers direct their search. Using online job board data, we show that high-wage ads attract more applicants as in directed search models. Due to distinctive data features, we also estimate significant but milder directed search for hidden (or implicit) wages, suggesting that ad texts and requirements tacitly convey wage information. Since explicit-wage ads often target unskilled workers, other estimates in the literature ignoring hidden-wage ads may suffer from selection bias. Moreover, job ad requirements are aligned with their applicants' traits, as predicted in directed search models with heterogeneity." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku).
Erfasst von	Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Nürnberg
Update	2019/4