Group learning, wage dispersion and non-stationary offers.

Autor/in	Rotemberg, Julio J.
Titel	Group learning, wage dispersion and non-stationary offers. Gefälligkeitsübersetzung: Gruppenlernen, Lohndispersion und flexible Angebote.
Quelle	In: Economica / London School of Economics an Political Science, 84 (2017) 335, S. 365-392 PDF als Volltext Link als defekt meldenVerfügbarkeit
Sprache	englisch
Dokumenttyp	online; gedruckt; Zeitschriftenaufsatz
ISSN	0013-0427; 1468-0335
DOI	10.1111/ecca.12225
Schlagwörter	Wahrnehmung; Lernen; Peer Group Review; Informelle Kommunikation; Einkommensunterschied; Einkommenserwartung; Lohnflexibilität; Lohnhöhe; Lohnstruktur; Arbeitsloser; Arbeitsuche; Arbeitsuchender; Lohnfindung
Abstract	"Can differences in equilibrium beliefs among otherwise identical individuals account for a substantial degree of wage inequality? This paper shows that this is possible if two conditions are met. First, people learn about the distribution of wage offers from the experience of their peers, and second, people believe that wage offers are stationary even though offers that arrive later tend to have higher wages than offers that arrive earlier. Peer groups can then end up with different stable beliefs that lead to intergroup wage differences. The non-stationarity of offers is rationalized in a model where firms can either advertise their job openings or not, and where advertised ones have more influence on more inexperienced job searchers. A statistic is proposed whose application to existing studies suggests that the non-stationarity considered here is present in data." (Author's abstract, Published by arrangement with John Wiley & Sons).
Erfasst von	Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, Nürnberg
Update	2017/4